

1. *What Spectrum Inversion Involves*

- a.) Find two qualities which we can experience which are distinct but have complementary relations to everything else.
- b.) Imagine the situation in which one feature is substituted for the other, and one accommodates to that fact: one could then behave just as one had before the switch.
- c.) Imagine someone suddenly suffering an illusion of the situation being as in (b) but then coming to accommodate;
- d.) Imagine someone always like in (c), while the rest of us have normal experience.

Take a case in which we start with two twins, one is normal the other is as in case (d). This is a situation in which the twins are causally hooked up to the world in the same way and react to situations just the same. Hence it appears that there are no differences in functional facts between them, yet they differ in experiential facts.

Functionalism:

- i.) If two objects o and o' are the same with respect to functional facts (more specifically, if the same functionalized psychological theory FPT holds of o and o' and whatever states as specified in FPT are possessed by o , the same states are possessed by o') then they are the same with respect to psychological facts.
- ii.) (i) holds because the psychological facts are nothing over and above certain functional facts.

If the inverted spectrum is indeed possible, then we have a counter-example to (i): a situation in which two individuals are in the same functional states but exemplify qualitatively different experiential states.

2. *What Becoming a Zombie Involves*

What real constraints does the functionalized version of a psychological theory impose on an entity of which it is true? Couldn't a suitably large and complex organization like IBM or the People's Republic of China instantiate the theory? (Block's worry.)

One might answer, as Dennett does: 'No'. The complexity of the human brain in relation to psychological functioning is hugely complex – but is that complexity really reflected in our folk psychological platitudes?

Since the functional theory says nothing itself about consciousness or being aware of anything, couldn't something exemplify that causal structure and yet be dark on the inside?

This would be a *philosophical zombie*. Not the creatures who feature in Val Lewton's masterpiece, *I Walked with a Zombie*; not the creatures from Michael Jackson's video for

Thriller, but something which on the outside and in its interactions with the world around us is just like you or me, but within lacks real consciousness.

What does imagining the possibility of a philosophical zombie involve? Can one conceive it in the way that one does spectrum inversion?

3. *Conceivability & Possibility*

If something is *conceivable* does that show that it is *possible*?

If you can imagine that something is the case does that show it is possible?

What is the connection between *conceivability* and *imaginability*?

You can conceive Goldbach's conjecture to be true and conceive it to be false. If it is true, it is necessarily true, if false necessarily false.

Isn't conceivability at least a guide to possibility? How can you come to know that the wardrobe will fit through the front door?

4. *Shoemaker on Absent Qualia*

Why think absent qualia are *impossible*? According to Shoemaker we all know that we have qualitative states, but if absent qualia were possible then we could not possess such knowledge.

Shoemaker relies on the principle that a belief cannot be knowledge if it could as easily have been false as true: If John knows that he has a hand, then John wouldn't believe that he has a hand, if he didn't have a hand.

If we could possibly have been zombies, then we would have had false beliefs about the presence of qualitative states, so if this principle is correct, we don't know we have qualitative states.

But is this principle correct?

Suppose we need to track the way of coming to know employed by a thinker. Can we assume that the zombie uses the same way of coming to know as we do?

5. *Mill & Absent Qualia*

If one accepts the arguments against functionalism, then Mill's position may seem superior to Putnam's on the question of other minds. But at that stage one will need to rely on the contrast between what is metaphysically possible, that qualitative states and functional role come apart; and what is nomologically possible, that given the kinds of states we have and the effects that they produce, it is guaranteed that states with the same powers to produce behaviour will be qualitatively alike.

But note: if one supposes that qualitative states are epiphenomenal – i.e. have no causal consequences – then how can one carry out Mill's reasoning.

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